Georgia\u27s New Battleground pp.14-18 by unknown
Five Georgia Law professors
examine the state’s new tort legislation
In February, after several years of debate, the Georgia General Assembly 
enacted a comprehensive set of tort reform provisions. This fairly complex body 
of legislation contains 16 separate sections dealing with procedure, evidence and 
substantive tort issues. Shortly after it was signed into law, five Georgia Law  
professors sat down with alumni and students to describe parts of the new  
legislation, to identify some issues that are likely to arise as the new laws go into 
effect and to speculate about what they think the likely impact will be on  
litigation. The following will provide you with summaries of their remarks.
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Offers of Judgment by 
Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Associate 
Professor of Law
Until the enactment of O.C.G.A. 9-
11-68, Georgia was one of only a hand-
ful of states that did not provide for 
offers of judgment. Most states’ “offer 
of judgment” rules are modeled after 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. The 
purpose for “offer of judgment” rules 
is to encourage the early settlement of 
cases, which in turn helps conserve judicial resources. 
Many lawyers and commentators, however, are of the opinion 
that Rule 68-type offers of judgment do not provide a very meaning-
ful incentive for assuring attainment of this goal because they only 
create the potential for the recovery of litigation costs. As a result, 
some state provisions also permit the awarding of certain special fees, 
such as expert witness fees, in addition to typical costs. And, a rela-
tively small number of states have gone even further by allowing for 
the recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees – Georgia is now included 
in that select group. 
Federal Rule 68 may be characterized as moderately confusing, 
but it’s “child’s play” compared to Georgia’s new “offer of judgment” 
statute, which is extremely lengthy and laden with numerous unde-
fined terms and confusing provisions that will, no doubt, be the 
subject of much satellite litigation in the future. Here is a general 
description of how it is seemingly supposed to operate.
First, Section 9-11-68 allows for both plaintiffs and defendants to 
make “offers of judgment” – not just defending parties, as provided 
for in Federal Rule 68. Offers may not be made before 30 days have 
elapsed from the date of service of the summons and complaint in 
an action, and may not be made less than 30 days before the date 
of trial (or 20 days before trial if it is a counteroffer). Once an offer 
is made (in writing), the offeree has 30 days within which to accept 
(in writing).
If the offeree rejects the offer, or otherwise fails to accept it within 
the specified time period, he or she may be on the hook for the rea-
sonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred after the date the offer was 
deemed to have been rejected. 
Under what specific circumstances will such fees and costs be 
recoverable? Unfortunately, this aspect of the statute contains con-
flicting language that suggests two possible approaches for answering 
this all-important “triggering” question.
Subsection (b) provides that: “... if the offeree rejects or does not 
accept the offer and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree was 
not at least 25 percent more favorable than the last offer, the offeree 
shall pay the offeror’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred 
after the rejection of the last offer” (O.C.G.A. 9-11-68(b) (emphasis 
added)).
Subsection (d)(1), on the other hand, indicates that if a court 
determines that: “... the offer of judgment was 25 percent more favor-
able than the monetary award, the court shall award reasonable attor-
ney’s fees and costs ...” (O.C.G.A. 9-11-68(d)(1) (emphasis added)). 
Without going into the math, the important point is these incon-
sistent and confusing provisions will produce different triggering 
amounts.
The imposition of fees and costs is mandatory if the “trigger” is 
satisfied, and a timely motion is made. But, there is one significant 
proviso with regard to the operation of the statute - the trial judge 
has been granted discretion to disallow an award of fees and costs 
that is technically called for under the terms of the statute, if the 
court determines that the offer was not made in “good faith” (which 
is not defined). 
There is also one additional component to the offer of judgment 
statute that has absolutely nothing to do with offers of judgment. 
Section 9-11-68(e) allows for the prevailing party, at the time of 
the verdict or judgment, to request the “finder of fact” to determine 
whether the opposing party’s claim or defense was frivolous (which is 
defined in the statute, but in a very confusing and awkward fashion). 
If the request is made, the court is required to conduct a “sepa-
rate bifurcated hearing” at which the “finder of fact” shall determine 
whether the claim or defense was frivolous, and then whether dam-
ages should be awarded. 
The subsection further provides that these “damages” may include 
“reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation” in 
addition to any other damages that might be established.
Subsection (e) is very interesting, or perplexing, for a host of 
reasons. For one thing, there is already a statute (O.C.G.A. 9-15-
14) that allows for the recovery of such fees and expenses in civil 
litigation under similar circumstances, and Subsection (e) expressly 
indicates that a party must choose between the two. As a result, is 
Section 9-11-68(e) simply overkill? 
In addition, Subsection (e) allows for the possibility that a party, 
against whom an award of attorney’s fees and costs can be made 
under the “offer of judgment” subsections, could nevertheless obtain 
an award of his or her own attorney’s fees and costs (or other dam-
ages). This is theoretically possible because one only needs to be a 
“prevailing party” in order to seek recovery under this subsection 
(e.g., a plaintiff can prevail, but still not satisfy the 25 percent more 
favorable requirement). 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Subsection (e) seems to 
allow for the “frivolousness” determination to be made by a jury, 
rather than the court. The subsection uses the phrase “finder of fact” 
rather than “court,” which seems to connote “sometimes jury, some-
times judge.” Thus, in many instances, cases may end with a separate 
“mini” jury trial, which obviously has the potential to elongate and 
unduly complicate the process, and certainly presents an opportunity 
for abuse. 
Expert Opinions by Ronald L. 
Carlson, Callaway Chair of Law 
Emeritus 
Few cases of any dimension are tried 
without the assistance of at least one, if 
not several, expert witnesses. 
Georgia’s new legislation cuts broad-
ly across the landscape of expert witness 
law. 
Not simply restricted to medical 
cases, the 2005 statute makes clear it 
Presented in March to attendees of the Joseph Henry 
Lumpkin Society Educational Seminar Series (reserved for 
annual Georgia Law donors of $1,000 or more and their 
guests) in Atlanta and to law students at a forum on campus.
amends courtroom practice for experts across the board in civil cases 
from products liability to contract disputes.
Section 7(a) of the 2005 act provides: “The provisions of this 
Code section shall apply in all civil actions.” It goes on to amend 
O.C.G.A. 24-9-67 with new language, and then adds a new code 
section O.C.G.A. 24-9-67.1. 
Mirroring much of Federal Evidence Rule 703, the statute states: 
“The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases 
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known 
to the expert at or before the hearing or trial. If of a type reasonably 
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible 
in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.”
Clearly under new O.C.G.A. 24-9-67.1(a), an expert can rely 
upon trustworthy written hearsay. For example, expert A can rely 
upon reports from expert B when A testifies. A medical doctor can 
give her opinions about a patient based upon her treatment of the 
patient as well as a written diagnosis supplied by another doctor, even 
though the latter doctor does not testify in the case. An expert in aviation 
accidents can rely upon reports of official boards of inquiry in order 
for the expert to reach his own conclusions regarding the cause of 
an air crash. Such an opinion in Georgia is no longer subject to an 
“opinion based on hearsay” objection. 
What about indications at other points in the new act that may 
seem to be contrary to the foregoing conclusions? 
These emanate from Section 7(b) that provides that the expert’s 
opinions should be drawn from data “which are or will be admitted 
into evidence.” Because this language is at odds with the language 
previously quoted from section 7(a), which provision controls?
As I noted earlier, Section 7(a) mirrors federal rule language. 
New Georgia Section 7(f) directs courts of this state to draw from 
the decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals to interpret 
the new act. 
Since Daubert is based upon the Federal Rules of Evidence, the 
Georgia legislature seems to intend for local courts to follow federal 
expert witness law in areas of questionable interpretation. 
Because of the legislation’s apparent desire to align Georgia with 
federal practice, a conclusion seems inescapable that the new Statute 
7(a) (the federal model) prevails over Statute 7(b)(1) (the old com-
mon law pattern). 
In qualifying experts under the new act, there are special expert 
requirements in medical malpractice actions. The expert must be a 
member of the same profession as the defendant doctor. Also, he or 
she must have actively practiced the specialty for three of the past five 
years or been a teacher of the topic for the same period. 
A pretrial hearing on these questions is mandated, upon motion 
of a party. 
Finally, in civil actions by patients against doctors, any apologies 
made by the doctor for bad surgical or medical work shall not be 
viewed as party admissions against the physician - Section 6(c).
A lingering question relates to the standard for novel scientific 
proof in civil cases. For many years, Georgia practice has been con-
trolled in both civil and criminal cases by the Harper test. Now, civil 
case practitioners are directed to the Daubert standard - Section 7(f). 
As a result, it may be forcefully argued that Harper has been 
replaced by Daubert in product liability, personal injury and other 
civil actions.
Emergency Healthcare 
Liability by Thomas A. Eaton, 
Hosch Professor of Law
Section 10 of Senate Bill 3 lim-
its liability for emergency room-based 
malpractice claims. This provision cre-
ates a new Code section, O.C.G.A. 
51-1-29.5. 
There are three main features of this 
legislation. First, the level of culpability 
needed to support liability is increased 
from negligence to gross negligence. Second, the plaintiff ’s burden 
of proof is increased from a preponderance of evidence to clear and 
convincing evidence. Third, the statute requires certain jury instruc-
tions be given in emergency room cases. 
Subsection (d) provides the court “shall instruct the jury to con-
sider” whether or not the health care provider had a full medical 
history of the patient, whether or not there was a preexisting doctor-
patient relationship, the circumstances constituting the emergency, 
and the circumstances surrounding the delivery of emergency medi-
cal care.
The scope of these new rules may be both broader and more nar-
row than one might think. They may be broader in the sense that 
they apply not only to tort claims arising from emergency medical 
care provided in an emergency room, but also to medical care pro-
vided in “an obstetrical unit or in a surgical suit immediately follow-
ing the evaluation or treatment of a patient” in a hospital emergency 
room. 
The new rules may be narrower in the sense that they are not 
triggered unless there is a genuine emergency. The phrase “emergency 
medical care” is defined in terms of an acute medical condition and 
not merely the location of where the care is provided. 
In order to constitute an emergency, “the absence of immediate 
medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in plac-
ing the patient’s health in serious jeopardy, serious impairment to 
bodily functions, or serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part” 
(O.C.G.A. 51-1-29.5(a)(5)). 
Thus, the gross negligence, clear and convincing burden of 
proof, and mandatory jury instruction provisions would not apply 
to patients who receive medical care in the emergency room, but to 
those whose condition satisfies the definition of a bona fide emer-
gency. The limited definition of “emergency medical care” should 
prevent this new statute from becoming a de facto immunity in the 
unfortunately all too common situation in which poor people receive 
non-emergency care in local emergency rooms.
It is ironic, or perhaps tragic, that this legislation provides greater 
insulation from tort liability to those claims arising from the single 
location of a hospital where negligence is most likely to occur. In 
the most far reaching empirical study of treatment-induced injuries 
(“adverse events”), researchers from the Harvard School of Public 
Health concluded that over 70 percent of adverse events in an emer-
gency room were the result of negligence. O.C.G.A. 51-1-29.5 will 
make such claims more difficult to pursue. 
Section 11 of Senate Bill 3 substantially eliminates the doctrine of 
apparent agency in the hospital setting. For a bit of background, most 
physicians are not employees of the hospitals in which they practice. 
They are considered independent contractors. Consequently, hospi-
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tals are not, as a general matter, vicariously liable for the torts com-
mitted by physicians. 
An exception to this general rule has been recognized under 
Georgia law. Under the doctrine of apparent agency, a hospital can 
be rendered vicariously liable for the negligence of a physician if the 
physician is deemed to be the “apparent agent” of the hospital. 
Apparent agency may be found when the hospital represents that 
the doctor is its agent and the patient relies on that representation. 
The doctrine of apparent agency is most often invoked in the context 
of hospital-based practices, such as emergency rooms, pathology, 
radiology and anesthesiology. 
Section 11, which will be codified as O.C.G.A. 51-2-5.1, pre-
scribes how a hospital can avoid liability under apparent agency for 
these and a number of other health care professionals. However, 
the impact of this provision on medical liability may be relatively 
limited. 
Hospitals remain potentially liable for their own acts of institu-
tional negligence and vicariously liable for the negligence of their 
actual agents. Moreover, the physicians who, in the absence of the 
statute, might previously have been deemed apparent agents are 
subject to liability for their individual acts of negligence. Moreover, 
such physicians usually have sufficient insurance or other assets to 
provide compensation. Thus, the impact of Section 11 on the ability 
of a patient to secure compensation should be minimal. 
Venue by C. Ronald Ellington, 
Cleveland Chair of Legal Ethics 
and Professionalism
What changes in the law governing 
venue (where civil actions can be tried) 
does the 2005 Georgia tort reform legis-
lation make? Let’s take a simple example: 
Suppose a person from Athens-Clarke 
County is involved in an automobile 
collision with two other motorists from 
Fulton County and Cobb County 
respectively. The accident happens on I-85 in Gwinnett County.
Where could the plaintiff bring one action against the other two 
drivers? Prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 3, one could answer 
confidently that the plaintiff could sue both the other drivers in 
either Fulton or Cobb county if it were alleged their separate, inde-
pendent acts of negligence combined naturally to cause an indivisible 
injury to the plaintiff. This result followed from the provision in 
Article 6, Section 2, Paragraph 4 of the Georgia Constitution that 
reads “suits against joint obligors, joint tort-feasors, joint promisors, 
copartners, or joint trespassers residing in different counties may be 
tried in either county.”
Suppose the plaintiff selects Fulton County and brings suit 
there against both defendants. Under the Constitution, as alleged 
joint tortfeasors, venue would be proper as to both. But what if the 
resident defendant from Fulton County is dismissed from the action 
before trial or a verdict is returned for that defendant but against the 
non-resident defendant from Cobb County? 
For over 100 years, the answer in Georgia case law was that venue 
vanished as to the non-resident defendant. The court lost jurisdiction 
to enter a judgment on the verdict against the non-resident defen-
dant only, and the plaintiff would have to re-try the case in Cobb 
County where the defendant resides.
Six years ago, the General Assembly acted to eliminate what it 
described as “the waste of time and resources to courts and parties 
under the vanishing venue doctrine.” Old O.C.G.A. 9-10-31(c), 
adopted in 1999, effectively ended the possibility that venue would 
vanish when a defendant was discharged “after the commencement 
of trial” by requiring the consent of all parties (including the victori-
ous plaintiff ) before the action could be transferred.
Plainly, the 2005 Tort Reform Act undoes the 1999 statute and 
restores vanishing venue in O.C.G.A. 9-10-31(d). Accordingly, 
plaintiffs must carefully weigh once again whether the case against 
the resident defendant is a strong one, for if the resident defendant is 
not held by a judgment, any verdict against a resident of a different 
county sued there, because joined with the resident defendant, will 
be wasted.
This assumes the two co-defendants from Fulton and Cobb 
can still be sued together in the county where either resides in the 
first place. Can they today? O.C.G.A. 9-10-31(a) and (b) appear to 
assume they can. 
But, whether the plaintiff may constitutionally sue them in a 
single action is potentially called into question by Section 12 of 
Senate Bill 3 dealing with joint and several liability. If, as most read-
ers assume, O.C.G.A. 51-12-31 and 51-12-33(b) eliminate joint 
and several liability, then the constitutional underpinning that allows 
defendants from Fulton and Cobb counties to be sued together in 
one action in either county may be removed. 
If these defendants are no longer jointly liable, but only indi-
vidually liable for their own percentage of fault, then we can expect 
nonresident defendants to object to venue when the action is filed 
by arguing they are not “joint tortfeasors” and hence each has the 
constitutional right under Article 6, Section 2, Paragraph 6 to be 
sued in the county of his or her own residence. 
Of course, it may be plausible to conclude that even if the two 
defendants are no longer jointly liable, they still remain “joint tort-
feasors” for the purpose of the constitutional rule so long as their 
individual acts of negligence have combined to produce an indivis-
ible injury. But, there is reason for at least some argument on this 
score because some Georgia cases can be read to rest the right to sue 
joint tortfeasors, joint obligors or copartners residing in different 
counties in the county where any one resides on the principle that 
they are jointly liable. 
Without joint liability, the whole edifice may collapse. Quite 
plainly, the fact the Civil Practice Act treats defendants against whom 
claims arising from a single collision are asserted as proper parties for 
a single action does not mean venue would also be proper. Statutes, 
such as the Civil Practice Act, cannot expand or vary the constitu-
tional rules governing venue. 
While the legislature can eliminate joint liability for tortfeasors, 
one provision in O.C.G.A. 9-10-31 is constitutionally suspect. New 
Subsection (c) allows, in medical malpractice actions, a nonresident 
defendant to require the case be transferred to the county of that 
defendant’s residence if the tortious act giving rise to the lawsuit 
occurred in that county. 
If the nonresident defendant is a joint tortfeasor with a resi-
dent defendant, Article 6, Section 2, Paragraph 4 of the Georgia 
Constitution provides venue is proper where either defendant 
resides. The Supreme Court ruled in Glover v. Donaldson that a stat-
ute could not limit the plaintiff ’s choice to only one of the counties 
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in the case of joint tortfeasors. Relying on Glover, the State Court of 
DeKalb County ruled in Turner v. Beaird on March 21, 2005, that 
O.C.G.A. 9-10-31(c) was thus unconstitutional.
Finally, O.C.G.A. 9-10-31.1 gives Georgia courts authority, for 
the first time, to order transfers of civil actions from one county to 
another for the convenience of parties or witnesses and in the interest 
of justice. Applying factors typically used in forum non conveniens 
analysis such as “relative ease of access to sources of proof,” “possibil-
ity of viewing the premises when appropriate” and “administrative 
difficulties for forum courts,” the statute allows transfer to a “dif-
ferent county of proper venue.” What exactly this means is not free 
from doubt. Does “proper venue” mean a county where a plaintiff 
has the right to sue or can a defendant create a different county of 
proper venue by consent?
Surprisingly O.C.G.A. 9-10-31.1 also substantially duplicates a 
2003 statute, O.C.G.A. 50-2-21, which authorizes a Georgia court 
to dismiss an action if a more convenient forum exists outside the 
state. Whereas, O.C.G.A. 50-2-21 only applies to actions filed on 
or after its effective date of July 1, 2003, the provision in O.C.G.A. 
9-10-31.1 purports to be applicable to actions already pending when 
the new tort reform law became effective on Feb. 16. 
Whether the new law authorizing forum non conveniens dismiss-
als or transfers can be applied retroactively to cases already filed is 
likely to provoke serious constitutional challenges.
Joint Liability Rules by 
Michael L. Wells, Carter Chair in 
Tort and Insurance Law
In tort law, the rule of joint liabil-
ity holds that two or more defendants 
who are each causally responsible for a 
single “indivisible” injury may be held 
“jointly” liable for it. That is, in such a 
case, the plaintiff may recover all of his 
damages from any of the defendants. At 
the same time, the plaintiff is entitled to 
only one full recovery. Once he obtains 
this, the judgment is satisfied and he gets nothing from anyone else.
Some years ago, the Georgia legislature modified this rule. The 
legislature distinguished between cases where the plaintiff was at fault 
and cases where plaintiff was not at fault. It abandoned joint liability 
in the former situation but not the latter. 
In February 2005, the legislature passed a statute that modified 
the provisions bearing on joint liability. Some people, including 
legislative leaders who were behind the enactment of the new statute, 
say the new statute abolishes joint liability altogether.
I think this is a hasty, and probably incorrect, judgment. To begin 
with, we need to recall certain basic principles of statutory interpreta-
tion. First, it is generally agreed that the aim of statutory interpreta-
tion is to carry out the intention of the legislature. There is plenty of 
evidence the legislative leaders meant to abolish joint liability, based 
on what they said about the legislation. But this seems to me to be 
irrelevant, for reasons that are, in part, distinctive to statutory inter-
pretation in Georgia.
Given that, in Georgia, one determines legislative intent by look-
ing at the statute and the history of the statute, i.e., the way it has 
been amended over time. One also looks at the common law back-
ground of the statute as well as the structure of the statute, i.e., the 
way various parts of it relate to one another. 
One reason to question the assertion the new statute wholly 
abolishes joint and several liability is the statute contains no explicit 
language to that effect. The abolitionist argument, then, is the 
amendments must implicitly abolish joint liability. But it is far from 
clear that the amendments do any such thing. 
One section thought to abolish the joint liability rule is the 
amendment to O.C.G.A. 51-12-31. This section used to provide, 
in relevant part, that “except as provided in Code Section 51-12-33, 
where an action is brought jointly against several trespassers, the 
plaintiff may recover damages for the greatest injury done by any of 
the defendants against all of them.” 
Now, it provides that “where an action is brought jointly against 
several persons, the plaintiff may recover damages for an injury 
caused by any of the defendants against only the defendant or defen-
dants liable for the injury.” Left unchanged are the last two sentences 
of Section 31: “In its verdict, the jury may specify the particular 
damages to be recovered of each defendant. Judgment in such a case 
must be entered severally.” 
The new version describes the people one obtains damages against 
in the second part rather than the first, where it used to specify “tres-
passers.” This change has nothing to do with joint liability. 
The other change is taking out “the greatest injury done” and “all 
of them,” replacing that language with “an injury caused” [by any 
of the defendants]. This amendment does not touch joint liability 
either. 
Joint tortfeasors all cause an indivisible injury. Thus, they are all 
covered by the new language just as they were by the old language. 
All of them are covered by “only the defendant or defendants liable 
for the injury.” 
What the amendments do is to remove the confusing suggestion 
in the old law that there may only be joint liability against a less 
responsible defendant (“the greatest injury done”) for harm done by 
a more responsible defendant. 
What the language of the new statute does is to make clear that 
there is joint liability under the common law rule against all defen-
dants, those who bear responsibility for more of the negligence as 
well as those who bear responsibility for less of it.
The other provision that was changed is O.C.G.A. 51-12-33. The 
prior version of this is the statute that abolished joint liability when 
the plaintiff is at fault. One thing the new statute does is to divide 
the old statute up into three parts, with some of its propositions now 
appearing in (a), some in (b) and some in (g). The central point is 51-
12-33 does not address the broad issue of whether joint and several 
liability remains the rule in cases where the plaintiff is not at fault.
Another feature of the statute bears on whether it should be inter-
preted as abolishing joint liability. Nothing was done to O.C.G.A. 
51-12-32, the section in between the two we have looked at. That 
statute, as interpreted by the Georgia Supreme Court, authorizes “pro 
rata” contribution among joint tortfeasors. This provision would be a 
nullity if there were no joint liability. 
If the intent of the legislature was to repeal joint liability, the fram-
ers of the statute surely would have repealed Section 32. As matters 
stand, the partisans of the “abolition” thesis have to resort to reading 
this section as saying “except for [always] the following rules will 
apply.” The abolitionist view turns Section 32 into a superfluous pas-
sage. Yet, the Georgia Supreme Court avoids constructions that turn 
statutory language into “mere surplusage.”  ■
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